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Constitutional Law-COMMERCIAL
SPEECH
DOCTRINE-ACLARIFICATION OF THE PROTECTION
AFFORDED
ADVERTISING
UNDER
THE FIRST

U. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
AMENDMENT-Bigelow

Appellant Bigelow, managing editor of a Charlottesville,
Virginia weekly newspaper, published an advertisement for a
New York abortion referral and placement center.' As a result of
that act, he was prosecuted and convicted for violating a Virginia
statute which made it a misdemeanor to encourage or prompt the
procuring of an abortion by the sale or circulation of any publicat i ~ nBigelow
.~
appealed his c o n ~ i c t i o nchallenging
,~
the statute on
1. The advertisement was published in the Virginia Weekly, Feb. 8, 1971, a t 2, under
the direct responsibility of the appellant:
UNWANTED PREGNANCY
LET US HELP YOU
Abortions are now legal in New York.
There are no residency requirements.
FOR IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN
ACCREDITED HOSPITALS AND
CLINICS AT LOW COST
Contact
WOMEN'S PAVILION
515 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
or call any time
(212) 371-6670 or (212) 371-6650
AVAILABLE 7 DAYS A WEEK
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. We will make all
arrangements for you and help you with
information and counseling.
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 812 (1975).
2. Ch. 385, 4 18.1-63, [I9601 Va. Acts of Assembly 428:
If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner, encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
This statute was amended shortly after the appellant's conviction and again after the
Supreme Court's decision in the instant case. The most current version reads:
If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or through the use of a referral agency for profit, or in
any other manner, encourage or promote the performing of an abortion or the
inducing of a miscarriage in this state which is prohibited under this article, he
shall be guilty of a class 3 misdemeanor.
VA. CODEANN.§ 18.2-76.1 (1975), amending VA. CODEANN.$ 18.1-63 (1972), amending
ch. 385, 4 18.1-63, [I9601 Va. Acts of Assembly 428 (emphasis added).
The statute as amended would not have reached the appellant's actions since the
advertisement was for a New York referral agency which provided the abortion service in
New York and therefore did not encourage abortions within the State of Virginia.
3. The appellant was first tried and convicted in the County Court of Albemarle
County. He then appealed to the circuit court of that county where he received a trial de
novo before a judge on evidence consisting of stipulated facts. This evidence included an
excerpt containing the advertisement in question and the June 1971 issue of Redbook
magazine which was distributed in Virginia and contained abortion information. Appel-
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first amendment grounds as an abridgement of freedom of press
and speech, and as being overbroad. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction, holding that the first amendment
does not prohibit government regulation of commercial advertising.' On review, the United States Supreme Court vacated the
decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of
recent intervening cases dealing with state anti-abortion laws.5
Upon reconsideration, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed its
prior decision, finding nothing "which in any way affects our
earlier view? Bigelow again appealed. The United States
Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the Virginia
statute infringed upon constitutionally protected speech under
the first amendment.

T h e Commercial Speech Doctrine i n the Supreme Court
Not all speech is protected by the first amendment.' One
such unprotected area of speech, "purely commercial advertisA.

lant was sentenced to pay a fine of 500 dollars with 350 dollars thereof suspended conditioned upon no further violation of the statute. Brief for Appellant a t 5, Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
4. Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 191, 194, 191 S.E.2d 173, 175 (1972). The
appellant was denied standing to challenge the statute as overbroad by the Virginia
Supreme Court. Id. a t 198, 191 S.E.2d a t 178.
The United States Supreme Court in the instant case recognized the standing of the
appellant to challenge the Virginia statute as being overbroad under the principles set
forth in Dombrowski u. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). The Court declined to base its
decision on the issue of overbreath, however, because as a practical matter it was mooted
by the subsequent statutory amendment and because the "commercial speech" issue was
of "greater moment." 421 U.S. a t 818.
5. Bigelow v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 909 (1973) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)).
6. Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 341,200 S.E.2d 680 (1973). Examination of the
cases shows that the Virginia Supreme Court was correct. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), invalidated all state statutes which prohibited abortions prior to viability. Neither case mentioned anything about advertising. The
only possible application these two cases might have is to indicate the importance of
abortion as a matter of "public interest" and to show the possible illegality of the law
under which Bigelow was convicted. The Supreme Court ultimately noted its agreement
with the Virginia Supreme Court's conclusion that this was not an abortion case. 421 U.S.
a t 815 n.5.
7. "Fighting words," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), "obscenity," Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973), Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
481-85 (1957), "libel," Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974), and "words
of incitement," Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969), have traditionally not been
protected by the first amendment because such speech is considered "patently offensive."
Commercial speech, while often not protected by the first amendment, is not "patently
offensive" and should not, therefore, be grouped with the above-listed types of speech.
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ing," was identified in Valentine v. Chre~tensen,~
a 1942 case in
which Chrestensen sought to circumvent a New York City ordinance proscribing the distribution of commercial handbills by
attaching to the reverse side of a handbill, which advertised tours
of a submarine, a protest against the city for not allowing him to
exhibit his submarine at a municipal pier. When the police interfered with the distribution of his handbill, Chrestensen sought an
injunction, arguing that the ordinance unconstitutionally deprived him of freedom of speech. The Court rejected his claim,
stating:
This Court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating
information and disseminating opinion and that, though the
states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares. We are

equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on
government as respects purely commercial ad~ertising.~

The last sentence of the foregoing quotation has commonly been
cited in Supreme Court and lower court opinions as the origin of
the "commercial speech doctrine."1° The Chrestensen Court,
however, failed to articulate a rationale for its refusal to grant
first amendment protection to purely commercial speech.ll Further, the Court failed to define the scope of the doctrine." Subsequent judicial attempts to reconcile the commercial speech doctrine with the "fundamental rights"13 and the "preferred posi8. 316 U S . 52 (1942).
9. Id. at 54 (emphasis added).
10. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U S . 376, 384 (1973); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U S . 934 (1972); Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 191, 193, 191 S.E.2d 173, 175
(1972).
11. Commentators often assume that the genesis of this idea comes from the power
or the right of the government to regulate commercial activity. See Developments in the
Law: Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV.L. REV. 1005, 1027 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Developments in the Law].
12. Although Chrestensen spoke of "purely commercial advertising," the commercial
speech doctrine includes all commercial speech. This creates considerable confusion on
first impression because the terms "purely commercial advertising," "purely commercial
speech," "commercial advertising," "commercial speech," and "advertising" are often
used interchangeably. Most cases using the commercial speech doctrine have involved
commercial advertising, but other areas of commercial speech have also been denied first
amendment protection by the doctrine. These include the credit rating cases, see, e.g.,
Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25, 30 (5th Cir. 1973); Millstone v. O'Hanlon
Reports, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 269, 274 (E.D. Mo. 1974); and symbolic speech cases, see, e.g.,
Hodges v. Fitle, 332 F. Supp. 504, 508-09 (D. Neb. 1971).
13. See Whitney v. California, 274 U S . 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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tion"14 of speech and press in a wide variety of cases factually
distinct from Chrestensen likewise did not provide adequate
guidelines for those attempting to understand the parameters of
the doctrine.15
The Supreme Court has generally grounded its decisions in
the area on one of two tests.
1. The primary purpose test

In Chrestensen, the Court implicitly relied upon a test which
focused on the "primary purpose" of the advertiser in determining whether the advertisement was entitled to first amendment
protection. This test focused not on the speech in the advertisement itself but on the motive of the person producing the advertisement. The Court determined that Chrestensen's primary purpose in circulating his handbill was commercial and that, although he had added to the handbill a political protest which
ordinarily would have received first amendment protection, the
protest was attached solely to circumvent the city ordinance.
Therefore, the political protest was viewed as incidental to and a
part of the commercial speech and not protected by the first
amendment. l6
In Murdock v. Penn~ylvania,'~
the Court again faced a question of mixed protected and unprotected speech. Murdock, a Jehovah's Witness who sold religious pamphlets while soliciting
converts, challenged a city ordinance which required any person
who solicited within the city to purchase a license. He argued that
the requirement was a violation of his first amendment rights of
Brandeis' concurring opinion is considered a classic defense of the fundamental importance of free speech. See G. GUNTHER,
CASESAND MATERIALS
ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW1044
(9th ed. 1975).
14. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,90-97 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The
concurring opinion by Frankfurter gives a summary of the preferred position arguments
found in Supreme Court opinions.
15. For a discussion of the problems experienced by lower courts in using these
guidelines, see text accompanying notes 42-46 infra. The Supreme Court has not used the
commercial speech doctrine extensively. With the exception of the religious pamphleteering cases of the 1940's, see note 17 infra, the "commercial speech doctrine" surfaced only
occasionally, either as dicta in decisions on other grounds or as the subject of criticism in
separate opinions. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964)
(decided on libel grounds); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951) (decided on
right of privacy grounds); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (decided on other first
amendment grounds); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498,513-15 (1959) (Douglas,
J., concurring).
16. 316 U.S. a t 55.
17. 319 U.S. 105 (1943). For other Jehovah's Witnesses cases with similar fact situations and holdings, see Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Jamison v. Texas,
318 U.S. 413 (1943); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
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freedom of speech and religion.18 Employing a primary purpose
test to reach its decision, the Court held that an element of commercial activity does not preclude first amendment protection if
the primary motivation of the activity is not commercial.lg The
Court stated:
[Tlhe mere fact that the religious literature is "sold" by itinerant preachers rather than "donated" does not transform evangelism into a commercial enterprise. . . . The right to use the
press for expressing one's views is not to be measured by the
protection afforded commercial handbilk20

In Breard u. City of A l e ~ a n d r i athe
, ~ ~Court again applied the
primary purpose test. Breard involved an ordinance which prohibited salesmen from soliciting door-to-door without prior authorization by the landowner or resident of the dwelling. A doorto-door salesman of national magazines, convicted for a violation
of the ordinance, asserted that the ordinance abridged his first
amendment right of freedom of speech.22The Court upheld the
ordinance, stating that the petitioner's selling brought "into the
transaction a commercial feature,"23 or motive, which when
weighed against the homeowner's right to privacy, was entitled
to little weight.24
Commentators have called the primary purpose test
and of "little sense, either theoretically or practially."^^ Many argue that financial motive is irrelevant if it is
acknowledged that an important aspect of the first amendment
is the listener's interest in acquiring kn~wledge.~'
Furthermore,
they assert that the logical extension of the primary purpose test
would seriously reduce the scope of first amendment protection
"accorded virtually all periodicals, books, and newspapers, since
all these methods of communication are . . . primarily concerned
with maximizing profits."28The commentators also point to the
--

-

- -

-

18. 319 U.S. a t 107.
19. Id. a t 111-12.
20. Id. a t 111.
21. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
22. Id. a t 625.
23. Id. a t 642.
24. See id. a t 644-45. Breard is unique in the series of cases using the primary purpose
test in that the Court used a balancing approach.
25. Developments in the Law, supra note 11, a t 1028.
26. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the
Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO.W A S HL.. REV.429, 452 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Redish].
27. See, e.g., id.
28. Id. Obviously, the Court has never extended the primary purpose test this far.
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inadequacy of the primary purpose test when protected speech is
mixed with unprotected speech. The test results in either complete protection or complete lack of protection for the communication. This "either-or" approach fails to accommodate the fact
that communications fall along a continuum ranging from speech
meriting no first amendment protection to speech meriting a full
measure of such p r o t e ~ t i o n . ~ ~
2.

The content test

In New York Times Co. v. S u l l i ~ a n the
, ~ ~Times and four
clergymen were sued by Sullivan who claimed that the Times'
publication of a full page, paid political advertisement was libelO U S . ~ *Relying on the commercial speech doctrine of Chrestensen,
plaintiff sought to avoid any question of first amendment protection of the libelous speech.32The Court, apparently relying on an
approach which focused on the substantive content of the advertisement rather than the primary purpose or motive of the advert i ~ e rfound
, ~ ~ the advertisement to be political and therefore protected by the first amendment.34 The Court distinguished
Chrestensen noting that:
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U S . 254, 266 (1964); Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959) (books); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02
(1952) (movies); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (newspapers).
29. See Developments in the Law, supra note 11, a t 1027-28. The idea of a continuum
of first amendment protection ranging from full protection to little or no protection is the
result of the balancing technique often employed by the Court in first amendment cases.
See note 60 infra. Any given first amendment interest in a particular controversy will,
however, ultimately be either "protected" or not protected. That is, the first amendment
interest will either prevail over competing interests or not prevail. Nevertheless, the term
"first amendment protection," as used in this case note, is a shorthand statement for
"value of the first ;mendment interest in free speech." In other words, when the Court is
said to accord a certain quantum of first amendment protection to a particular expression,
it means that the Court has ascribed a certain value or weight to the first amendment
interest involved. Most judges and commentators use the term "first amendment protection" in this way. See, e.g., 421 U.S. a t 821; Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298, 314 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384, 386 (1973); Redish, supra note 26, a t 431, 447, 472;
Comment, The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: New Constitutional Considerations, 63 GEO.L.J. 775, 797 (1975).
30. 376 U S . 254 (1964).
31. Id. a t 256.
32. Id. a t 265-66.
33. The Supreme Court has never explicitly rejected the primary purpose test, but
because of its limited utility it has fallen into disuse. See text accompanying notes 25-34
supra. For a recent lower court case using this test, see Hodges v. Fitle, 332 F. Supp. 504,
509 (D. Neb. 1971) (motive determines what is commercial speech); cf. United States v.
Cerone, 452 F.2d 274, 286 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964 (1972) (intent of
speaker may be dispositive in determining the level of first amendment protection).
34. 376 U.S. a t 266.
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The publication here was not a "commercial" advertisement in
the sense in which the word was used in Chrestensen. It communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf
of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the
highest public interest and concern. That the Times was paid
for publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this
connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold.35

A content analysis was again used in Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Commission on Human relation^.^^ The newspaper's
use of sex-designated column headings in its classified advertising section was held to be a violation of a local ordinance that
prohibited sex dis~rimination.~'
The Court found that the content
of the advertisements was purely commercial and therefore without first amendment protection.
In the crucial respects, the advertisements in the present record
resemble the Chrestensen rather than the Sullivan advertisement. None [of the advertisements] expresses a position on
whether, as a matter of social policy, certain positions ought to
be filled by members of one or the other sex, nor does any of
them criticize the Ordinance . . . . Each is no more than a
proposal of possible employment. The advertisements are thus
classic examples of commercial speech.38

Commentators generally agree that the content test is preferable to the primary purpose test. Various arguments have been
advanced in support of this preference. First, the content test
recognizes that commercial motive does not necessarily make
~~
speech less deserving of first amendment p r o t e ~ t i o n .Second,
the content test eliminates problems of mixed motives.40Third,
the content test has a sounder theroetical base in that it focuses
not on motive but on speech, which is the preeminent value of the
first amendment."' The effect of these characteristics of the con35. Id. (citations omitted).
36. 413 U.S. 376 (1973). Pittsburgh Press, a five-to-four decision, is the first Supreme
Court case since Chrestensen to rely on the commercial speech distinction as the primary
determinant of the case. Other Supreme Court cases in the interim have involved the
commercial speech doctrine only incidently. See cases cited note 15 supra.
37. 413 U.S. at 378-81.
38. Id. at 385.
39. Cf. Redish, supra note 26, at 452.
40. Cf. note 33 supra.
41. See Redish, supra note 26, at 452-57; Note, Commercial Speech-An End in Sight
to Chrestensen?, 23 DEPAULL. REV. 1258, 1267 (1974); see generally A. MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL
FREEDOM
(1960).
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tent test is to provide first amendment protection for a greater
range of commercial expression.

B . T h e Commercial Speech Doctrine i n the Lower Courts
The lower courts have not been consistent in their application and definition of the commercial speech doctrine.42Statements of the doctrine range from absolute declarations that "the
First Amendment deals with the free exchange of ideas and not
with commercial 'factual' speech,"43to the opposite extreme that
"[elven advertisers enjoy first amendment rights, although it is
said that product advertising is 'less vigorously protected . . .
than other forms of speech.' "44 A large number of cases adopt an
approach similar to Chrestensen and deny protection without
attempting to give a rationale or define the scope of the commercial speech doctrine." As a result, many of the questions raised
by Chrestensen remain largely u n a n s ~ e r e d . ~ ~
C. T h e Theoretical Base of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
Lower court confusion as to the relationship between commercial speech and the first amendment can, in large part, be
traced to the theoretical framework generally attributed to the
Supreme Court in its interpretation of first amendment cases and
to the difficult choices that this framework requires in the commercial context. The Court is generally viewed as accepting Alexander Meiklejohn's interpretation of the first amendment4' which
42. DeVore and Nelson, Commercial Speech and Paid Access to the Press, 26
HASTINGS
L.J. 745,749 (1975); The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine,
supra note 29, a t 798.
43. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1306 (2d Cir. 1971); accord, Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821,825 (W.D. Va. 1969) (regulation of commercial
advertising does not intrude upon first amendment rights of free speech).
44. Fur Information & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E. F. Timme & Son, Inc., 364 F. Supp.
16, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); accord, Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 300 F. Supp.
1036, 1044 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (the commercial element does not
altogether destroy its quality as protected speech).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205,211 (4th Cir. 1972); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1306 (2d Cir. 1971); Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305
F. Supp. 821, 825 (W.D. Va. 1969). Contra, Fur Information & Fashion Council, Inc. v.
E. F. Timme & Son, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 16,22-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Rowan v. United States
Post Office Dep't, 300 F. Supp. 1036, 1039-40 (C.D. Cal. 1969). For a more complete
summary of these cases, see DeVore and Nelson, supra note 42; Annot., 37 L. Ed. 2d 1124
(1973).
46. DeVore and Nelson, supra note 42; The Right to Receive and the Commercial
Speech Doctrine, supra note 29, a t 798; see Note, The Commercial Speech Doctrine: The
First Amendment a t a Discount, 41 BROOKLYN
L. REV.60, 84-90 (1974).
47. Dr. Meiklejohn's articulation of the purposes that lie behind the first amendment
has received considerable attention from commentators. See Brennan, The Supreme
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draws a sharp distinction between private and public speech.48
Public speech, that is, speech vital to political decisions or of
importance to the governing forces of society, receives full first
amendment p r o t e ~ t i o n .Private
~~
speech, on the other hand, of
which commercial speech is a part, receives little or no first
amendment protection under this i n t e r p r e t a t i ~ nThe
. ~ ~ confusion
sets in early because the distinction between private and public
speech is difficult to make. This is particularly true in the area
of commercial speech which Meiklejohn ordinarily classifies as
private speech. Such a rigid categorization does not appear justified since commercial speech often conveys information essential
to informed personal decisionmaking which may ultimately affect
the quality of political decision^.^^
Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV.L. REV. 1
(1965); Redish, supra note 26, a t 434-41; Comment, Privacy, Defamation, and the First
Amendment: The Implications of Time, Inc. v. Hill, 67 COLUM.
L. REV.926,938-42 (1967).
The Supreme Court appears to have applied Meiklejohn's theory in: Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
48. A. MEIKLEJOHN,
supra note 41, a t 55-56. This distinction is drawn to prevent
political speech from losing its uniqueness since i t is viewed as essential to the maintenance of a free society. Id.
49. See id. a t 28.
50. See Redish, supra note 26, a t 432-36.
51. For a detailed discussion of these criticisms, see Kalven, The Metaphysics of the
Law of Obscenity, 1960 S. CT. REV.1, 15-16; Kaufman, The Medium, the Message and
the First Amendment, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV.761, 769 (1970); Redish, supra note 26, a t 43238; The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, supra note 29, a t 800-01;
cf. Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV.L. REV.891, 895-96 (1949). Individual members of the
Court have expressed similar criticisms. Justice Douglas, who participated in
Chrestensen, has long been a critic of the decision, maintaining that though the decision
was unanimous a t the time, "it has not survived reflection." Cammarano v. United States,
358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring); accord, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 398 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Glover, 404 U.S. 898, 905 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In
Dun & Bradstreet u. Glover, Justice Douglas stated his position as follows:
Nor, in my view, should commercial content be controlling. The language of the
First Amendment does not except speech directed a t private economic decisionmaking. Certainly such speech could not be regarded as less important thar?
political expression.
Id. a t 905. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, expressed
displeasure with the doctrine in his dissent in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298, 314 (1974) (footnote omitted):
[Wlhile it is possible that commercial advertising may be accorded less First
Amendment protection than speech concerning political and social issues of
public importance . . . it is "speech" nonetheless, often communicating information and ideas found by many persons to be controversial.
Justice Stewart, in his dissent in Pittsburgh Press, stated:
Whatever validity the Chrestensen case may still retain when limited to its own
facts, it certainly does not stand for the proposition that the advertising pages
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In the instant case, the Supreme Court narrowly defined
Chrestensen, stating that "[tlhe case obviously does not support
any sweeping proposition t h a t advertising is unprotected per
on past cases to support this position, the Court
~ e . " ~Relying
'
noted that speech is not stripped of first amendment protection
merely because it appears in commercial form.53Further, states
are not free of constitutional restraint merely because the advertisement "involved sales,"54or "because the appellant was paid
for printing it,"55or "because the appellant's motive or the motive
of the advertiser may have involved financial gain."" Relying on
New York Times and Pittsburgh Press, the Court stressed that
the content, not the commercial setting, determines the degree of
first amendment protection which an advertisement is to re~eive.~'
Contrasting the content of the abortion advertisement with
the purely commercial advertisements of Chrestensen and
Pittsburgh Press, the Court stated that the abortion advertisement did more than simply propose a commercial t r a n ~ a c t i o n . ~ ~
The information contained in the abortion advertisement, viewed
in its entirety, conveyed factual information of clear public interest and value to a diverse audience including those in need of such
services, those interested in the subject in general, those interested in laws of other states, and those interested in reforming
Virginia law.59
The Court then balanced the state interest served by the
regulation against the first amendment interest of the appellant.60
of a newspaper are outside the protection given the newspaper by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.
413 U.S. a t 401. Joining with Justice Stewart in his dissent was Justice Douglas. Justice
Blackmun joined with Justice Stewart in all of his dissent except the paragraph where
Justice Stewart criticized balancing as a judicial technique. Id. a t 404. This fact is
illuminating since Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion in the present case and
used a balancing approach.
52. 421 U.S. a t 820.
53. Id. at 818.
54. Id. (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1943), discussed in
text accompanying notes 17-20 supra).
55. 421 U.S. a t 818 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964),
discussed in text accompanying notes 30-35 supra).
56. 421 U.S. a t 418 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945)).
57. See 421 U S . a t 820-21.
58. Id. at 822.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 826-27. The Court states:
[Tlhe task of balancing the interests a t stake here was one that should have
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In support of the statute, the state had argued that the regulation
was necessary to maintain quality medical care within the state."
Although recognizing this as a legitimate state interest, the Court
gave it little or no weight since "[nlo claim has been made . . .
that this particular advertisement in any way affected the quality
of medical services within Virginia."62Turning next to the appellant's alleged free speech interest, the Court noted five considerations leading to the conclusion that the free speech interest must
prevail over countervailing interests of the state. First, since
newspapers have consistently been singled out for special first
amendment protection, the regulation here, if allowed, might
impair the proper functioning of a free national press.63Second,
the advertisement contained factual information of clear public
interest to a diverse audience.64Third, the advertisement contained no "patently offensive" elements which have traditionally
~~
the
been excluded from first amendment p r o t e ~ t i o n .Fourth,
activity advertised was not illegal in either Virginia or New
been undertaken by the Virginia courts before they reached their decision. We
need not remand for that purpose, however, because the outcome is readily
apparent from what has been said above.

Id.
For the factors the Court considered, see text accompanying notes 61-67 infra. A
balancing approach follows naturally from the Court's position that all advertising enjoys
a degree of first amendment protection, but it is unclear whether the Court used ad hoc
balancing or definitional balancing. Ad hoc balancing weighs the interests of the parties
in the particular case before it, while definitional balancing takes a particular type of
speech, e.g., commercial speech, and by balancing larger public policy factors, determines
the degree of first amendment protection to be afforded a particular category of speech.
Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to
Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL.L. REV.935, 944 (1968).
61. 421 U.S. at 827. The State of Virginia argued that allowing advertisements by
commercial abortion referral and placement centers produced fee splitting with and solicitation of patients for doctors by the agencies, practices which professional standards
condemn as lowering the quality of care ultimately given the patient. See Brief for AppeIlee a t 14, Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The state supported this argument by
noting that New York has, since this case arose, prohibited advertising of the type in issue
here. Id. a t 13. The New York statute withstood constitutional attack in S. P. S. Consultants, Inc. u. Lefkowitz, 333 F . Supp. 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). For other cases in which the
statute was enforced, see New York v. Abortion Information Agency, Inc., 323 N.Y.S.2d
597 (Sup. Ct. 1971); New York v. Mitchell, 321 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
62. 421 U.S. at 827. The Court felt there was little justification for a Virginia statute
which attempts to prevent Virginians from using services in New York, which are legal in
New York, by erecting an information shield. The Virginia statute was viewed by the
Court as an improper use of Virginia's police power. Id. a t 824-25.
63. Id. a t 828-29. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257-58
(1974). Part of the evidence in the Bigelow case was a similar advertisement published in
Redbook. See note 3 supra.
64. 421 U S . a t 822.
65. Id. a t 828.
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York? Fifth, the advertisement did not impinge upon other important individual rights such as the right to privacy.67The Court
concluded that the statute as applied impermissibly violated the
appellant's first amendment rights of freedom of speech and
The dissenting Justices argued that the advertisement in the
present case was entitled to little or no first amendment protection since it, like the ads in Chrestensen and Pittsburgh Press,
was merely an offer of services,69and was therefore outweighed by
the state's interest in preventing medical practices "inimical" to
the health of its citizens.'O

A.

Commercial Advertising and the First Amendment

The present case represents a significant attempt by the
Supreme Court to reconcile the commercial speech doctrine with
the guarantees of the first amendment. The Court, using Meiklejohn's private-public speech dichotomy, could have decided the
present case in one of two ways. By stressing the controversial
nature of the subject of the advertisement and the intense public
debate surrounding that subject as it related to political reform,"
the Court could have found the ad to be political and therefore
entitled to full first amendment protection. On the other hand,
the Court could have found that the ad was merely an offer of
services-clearly private speech-and without first amendment
protection. Instead, the Court recognized that the advertisement
published by the appellant contained both private and public
speech which when viewed in its entirety conveyed factual information of "public interest"72and therefore deserved some, though
66. Id. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 389 (1973).
67. 421 U.S. a t 829.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 831 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 830-31. For a recital of the practices "inimical to the public interest," see
note 61 supra.
71. Brief for Appellant a t 9, Bigelow v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 909 (1973). The Court in
its preface to Roe u. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973), acknowledged its
awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy, of
the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One's philosophy, one's
experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's religious
training, one's attitude toward life and family and their values, and the moral
standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and
to color one's thinking and conclusion about abortion.
72. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
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perhaps not a full degree of, first amendment protection. Indeed,
the Court stated in dictum that even purely commercial advertising is entitled to a degree of constitutional pr~tection.'~
The Court
therefore, by affording at least some first amendment protection
to commercial speech, took a significant step away from Meiklejohn's generalization that commercial speech is included in the
private speech category and merits no such protection. A question
remains, however, concerning the degree or scope of protection
the Court will afford commercial speech under the new approach
of the present case.

B. The Scope of Protection
The present case does not stand for the proposition that all
commercial advertising is to receive full first amendment protection; the language of the Court is explicit in stating that purely
commercial speech enjoys only a degree of such protection.'' It
appears, however, that each particular advertisement will receive
a varying degree of protection depending on the value or importance the Court ascribes to the message or informational content
of the ad. This thesis is supported by a comparison of the present
case with New York Times and Pittsburgh Press, two cases representing the extremes of a continuum of protection. The ad in New
York Times, representing a solely political advertisement, falls a t
one extreme and receives full first amendment pr~tection.'~
The
Pittsburgh Press ads, representing purely commercial advertisements, fall a t the other extreme and receive a minimal degree of
prote~tion.'~
The ad in the present case was like the advertisement in New York Times in that i t conveyed to a diverse audience
information which was vital to important personal decisionmaking a t both the private and public levels. But it was also similar
to the Pittsburgh Press ads in that it was intended as an offer of
services and did not explicitly advocate or express a position on
matters of public policy. Since the abortion ad contains elements
found in both the New York Times and the Pittsburgh Press
advertisements, it falls somewhere between these two extremes
73. 421 U.S. a t 821. The proposition that all advertising, including "purely commercial" advertising, receives a degree of first amendment protection is strongly supported
by dicta in the opinion. Id. Since the Court held that the abortion advertisement was not
purely commercial, however, it is not possible to state the exact position the Court would
take when faced with a purely commercial advertisment, if such a category of advertisements continues to exist. See text immediately following note 80 infra.
74. 421 U.S. a t 821.
75. See text accompanying notes 30-35 supra.
76. See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
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and was so treated by the Court." Indeed, it can be argued that
the Court in the present case created and applied an approach
that permits a limitless number of intermediate treatments: the
Court evaluates each advertisement on an ad hoc basis and affords each ad a varying degree of protection depending on the
relative importance of its message or informational content.
The present case, like New York Times and other prior cases,
ascribes importance to commercial messages of "public intere ~ t . " 'The
~ Court, however, appears to have expanded the scope
of the term "public interest." The term was used in New York
Times to refer to information vital to political decisi~nmaking.~~
As used in the present case, however, the term includes not only
information vital to the political processes but information of
interest to a diverse audience for other than political reasons.*O
Significant consequences flow from this expanded definition of
"public interest." Since nearly all advertising is of some "public
interest," as the term is used in the present case, the category of
purely commercial speech becomes relatively insignificant or
even nonexistent. The end result is that a greater number and
variety of advertisements qualify for a greater measure of first
amendment protection. Indeed, it can be argued that with its
expanded definition of "public interest," the Court is moving
toward greater first amendment protection for all commercial
speechY
77. See 421 U S . at 818-22, 826.
78. 421 U S . a t 822.
79. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
80. See 421 U S . a t 822.
81. The instant case is already having an impact on lower court treatment of the
commercial speech doctrine with a resultant increase in protection afforded advertising.
In Terminal-Hudson Electronics, Inc. v. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, 44 L.W. 2337 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 6, 1976), a three judge federal district court struck down as violative of the first
amendment California statutes prohibiting advertisements of the cost of commodities
furnished or services performed, by optometrists. In reaching its decision, the court stated:
The state, however, contends that news media paid informational advertisements of price structures for commodities and services are "commercial" speech
and enjoy no First Amendment protection under the rationale and rule of Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The Chrestensen rational has been
criticized for nearly 20 years and was lately sent into oblivion by the Supreme
Court's decision in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U S . 809,43 LW 4734 (1975). Bigelow
involved commercial advertising of an abortion referral service, while the issue
before this court is commercial advertising of eyeglasses. But both involve commercial advertising and this court sees no significant distinction between the
two.
Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The present case, while not defining the boundaries of the
commercial speech doctrine in all circumstances, substantially
clarifies the Court's position on commercial speech and the first
amendment and gives viable guidelines to those lower courts
which have been divided on the issue. It should now be clear that
a per se exclusion of commercial speech from first amendment
protection is unacceptable. A free speech interest, though perhaps limited, inheres in all commercial messages. That interest
must be evaluated and balanced against any competing state
interest and afforded an appropriate degree of protection from
restrictive measures.

